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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

KILMON V. STATE: A PREGNANT WOMAN'S INTENTIONAL
INGESTION OF COCAINE CANNOT FORM THE BASIS FOR
A CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 3-204(A)(1) OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW ARTICLE FOR THE RECKLESS
ENDANGERMENT OF HER LATER-BORN CHILD.

By: Jason Weintraub
In a consolidated case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
a pregnant woman's prenatal ingestion of cocaine does not form the
basis for a conviction under section 3-204(a)(l) of the Criminal Law
Article for the reckless endangerment of her later-born child. Kilman
v. State, 394 Md. 168, 905 A.2d 306 (2006). The Court concluded
Maryland's reckless endangerment statute, as outlined in Maryland
Criminal Law Article section 3-204(a)(l) (2006), was not designed
with the legislative intent to hold pregnant women criminally liable for
the prenatal ingestion of cocaine. Kilman, 394 Md. at 183, 905 A.2d
at 315.
The first of the two consolidated cases began in June, 2004, when
Regina Kilmon ("Kilmon") gave birth to her son at Easton Memorial
Hospital. At the time of birth, a drug screening of the child revealed
675 nanograms per milliliter of cocaine in his system; 375 nanograms
per milliliter above minimum sensitivity levels. In August, 2004,
Kilmon was charged in the Circuit Court for Talbot County with
second-degree child abuse, contributing to child delinquency, reckless
endangerment, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance.
All charges were based on evidence that Kilmon ingested cocaine
while pregnant. Kilmon pled guilty to reckless endangerment and was
sentenced to four years in prison. The Court of Special Appeals
granted her application for leave to appeal. However, the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari before proceedings commenced.
In the second case, Kelly Lynn Cruz ("Cruz") was admitted to
Easton Memorial Hospital in January, 2005, complaining of stomach
pains.
Hospital records indicated she was twenty-nine weeks
pregnant. Cruz gave birth to a three-pound, two-ounce baby boy.
Drug screenings given to both the newborn and the mother at the
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hospital tested positive for cocaine. In April, 2005, Cruz was charged
in the Circuit Court for Talbot County with second-degree child abuse,
contributing to child delinquency, reckless endangerment, and
possession of a controlled dangerous substance.
In Cruz's case, the Circuit Court for Talbot County found her guilty
of reckless endangerment and imposed a sentence of five years in
prison, with two-and-a-half years suspended in favor of supervised
probation and drug treatment. Cruz appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari prior to any proceedings by the intermediate appellate court.
The Court consolidated the Kilmon and Cruz appeals to consider the
common issue of whether the intentional ingestion of cocaine, while
pregnant, violates Md. Criminal Law Code Ann. section 3-204(a)(1).
Kilman, 394 Md. at 121,905 A.2d at 308.
Section 3-204(a)(1) makes it a misdemeanor for an individual to
"engage in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious
physical injury to another." Kilman, 394 Md. at 173, 905 A.2d at 308.
The State argued that the appellants' prenatal ingestion of cocaine
recklessly endangered their children immediately upon and after their
births, and such conduct specifically falls under the purview of section
3-204(a)(1). Kilman, 394 Md. at 173, 905 A.2d at 309. However, the
State avoided the controversial debate regarding the classification of
an embryo or fetus as a person by noting in its briefs that the "person"
harmed by the appellant's conduct was the child, after the child's live
birth. [d.
In support of its argument that a pregnant woman's reckless
conduct which harms her unborn child should be punishable under
section 3-204(a)(1), the State noted that a third-party is criminally
liable for an injury committed while a child is in utero, but later born
alive. Kilman, 394 Md. at 175, 905 A.2d at 310 (citing Williams v.
State, 77 Md. App. 411, 550 A.2d 722 (1988), aff'd, 316 Md. 617, 561
A.2d 216 (1989)). In Williams, the defendant shot a woman who was
nine months pregnant with a bow and arrow. [d. The mother died as a
result of the injury; her child was born alive, but died shortly
thereafter. [d. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the defendant
could be convicted of two counts of manslaughter, one for the mother
and one for the child born alive. [d. The State notes that the "born
alive" rule, and its application to the crime of common law
manslaughter, was upheld by the Court of Appeals in Williams just
prior to the enactment of the reckless endangerment statute in 1989.
Kilman, 394 Md. at 176, 905 A.2d at 311. As a result, the State argues

66

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 37

that the General Assembly, in enacting section 3-204(a)(l), meant to
"criminalize conduct committed by anyone, including a pregnant
woman, that recklessly endangers the later-born child." [d.
According to the Court, whether the General Assembly intended to
include the conduct of a pregnant woman who might endanger her
child is unclear, as the reckless endangerment statute does not
specifically address such behavior. Kilman, 394 Md. at 177, 905 A.2d
at 311. As a result, other factors must be considered in absence of
clear legislative intent. [d. Based on the State's arguments, the
application of the statute to the conduct of pregnant women "could
well be construed to include not just the ingestion of unlawful
controlled substances but a whole host of intentional and conceivably
reckless activity that could not possibly have been within the
contemplation of the Legislature." Kilman, 394 Md. at 177, 905 A.2d
at 311. According to the Court, if the State's position were to prevail,
a pregnant woman's criminal liability for actions ranging from failing
to maintain a proper diet, to avoiding proper prenatal medical care,
would depend entirely on the aggressiveness of a particular prosecutor.
Kilman, 394 Md. at 178, 905 A.2d at 312.
To further its argument that the Maryland General Assembly did
not intend to consider the ingestion of cocaine by pregnant women a
criminal act under section 3-204(a)(l), the Court also looked to the
history of failed legislation. Kilman, 394 Md. at 178, 905 A.2d at 312.
In 1990, four legislative proposals attempted to classify physical
injuries to an unborn child that resulted from a mother's use of
controlled dangerous substances as criminal child abuse. Kilman, 394
Md. at 179, 905 A.2d at 312. Subsequently, all of those bills failed.
[d. In the 2004 legislative session, the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act was introduced to criminalize actions that "recklessly create a
substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to an unborn child."
Kilman, 394 Md. at 180, 905 A.2d at 313. Similar to previous
attempts at criminalizing pregnant women's drug use, the legislation
failed. [d.
Over the course of sixteen years of legislative history, the Court
noted that the General Assembly has failed to impose criminal
penalties for a pregnant woman's ingestion of controlled substances,
due to the effects such ingestion might have on the child, either before
or after birth. Kilman, 394 Md. at 181, 905 A.2d at 314. The Court
deferred to the way in which the General Assembly dealt with the
issue of prenatal ingestion of illegal drugs, specifically its desire to
provide drug treatment programs for pregnant women, and the

2006]

Reckless Endangerment of a Child

67

termination of parental rights as a mechanism if these women failed to
properly care for their child. [d. at 182, 905 A.2d at 314. The Court
noted that incarcerating drug-addicted pregnant women had proven
"ineffective in other States in deterring either that conduct or addiction
generally on the part of pregnant women." Kilman, 394 Md. at 182,
905 A.2d at 314. As such, in light of the way in which the Maryland
General Assembly had addressed this issue, the Court held it was not
the legislative intent that section 3-204(a)(l) of the Criminal Law
Article apply to the prenatal drug ingestion of pregnant women.
Kilman, 394 Md. at 183,905 A.2d at 315.
The Court in Kilman upheld the longstanding view in Maryland
that drug-addicted mothers need access to treatment, not punishment.
While a pregnant mother's ingestion of drugs may in fact be reckless
in nature, the Court's decision to provide treatment, instead of
incarceration, may give mothers and their children a greater chance at
overcoming such terrible addictions.

